Achieving transparency in pro-poor education incentives

Abstract

Th is book assumes that different models of design, targeting, and management of pro-poor incentives can prove more or less successful in maximizing effi ciency, transparency, and accountability, and in minimizing the likelihood of errors, fraud, and corrupt practices. To make its case, it compares diff erent models of educational incentives to determine which prove more or less successful in reaching their initial objectives. Each model is characterized using the following variables: (i) universal versus categorical targeting; (ii) conditional versus unconditional transfers; (iii) cash versus in-kind transfers; and (iv) top-down versus community-based approaches. More specially, it reviews seven pro-poor educational incentive programmes on the basis of these diff erent variables, namely: the quintile ranking system (South Africa), the CESSP Scholarship Programme (Cambodia), the universal Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan programme (India), the Primary Education for Disadvantaged Children programme (Viet Nam), the Opportunity NYC (New York City) programme (United States), the National School Feeding Programme (Brazil), and the Juntos programme (Peru). Each chapter analyses offi cial programme documents and available studies and evaluation reports, and draws upon in-person interviews conducted for all the countries under review.