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dc.contributor.authorCarr, David
dc.date.accessioned8/12/2014 15:30
dc.date.available8/12/2014 15:30
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1741-5446
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12799/3085
dc.descriptionEducational Theory, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 1–14es_ES
dc.description.abstractWhile honesty is clearly a virtue of some educational as well as moral significance, its virtue-ethical status is far from clear. In this essay, following some discussion of latter-day virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, David Carr argues that honesty exhibits key features of both moral and epistemic virtue, and, more precisely, that honesty as a virtue might best be understood as the epistemic component of Aristotelian practical wisdom. In the wake of arguments to be found in Plato’s Laws, as well as in those of more modern philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and IrisMurdoch, Carr then traces the main roots of moral dishonesty to various forms of vain and self-delusive ego attachment. In this light, he argues in the final section of the essay that literature and the arts may provide a powerful educational antidote to such attachment.es_ES
dc.language.isoenes_ES
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sonses_ES
dc.subjectÉticaes_ES
dc.subjectFilosofía de la educaciónes_ES
dc.titleThe Human and Educational Significance of Honesty as an Epistemic and Moral Virtuees_ES
dc.typeArticlees_ES


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